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I. Introduction
It has become generally accepted in economic literature that at
least a large part of the persistent problems which developing
countries have with high inflation, fiscal imbalance, and exter-
nal debt have been caused by inconsistent monetary and exchange
rate policies. The nominal parities of their currencies were
mostly fixed or devaluation rates too low to account for the
external shocks experienced before and after the debt crisis
emerged (e.g. unfavourable changes in the terms-of-trade, rising
world market interest rates and increased rationing of external
credit). Fiscal deficits were often financed by monetary expan-
sion. As a result, the real exchange rates have become overvalued
[Edwards, 1989b], and most developing countries face the problem
of devaluing their real exchange rate to a level which is consis-
tent with internal and external equilibrium and, thus, sustain-
able in the long run.
There are two basic concepts of real exchange rate devaluation
given that the overvaluation of a currency results from the in-
consistency of monetary and exchange rate policies:, monetary
contraction and nominal devaluation. The monetary expansion may
be slowed down to be consistent with a given parity or, alter-
natively, the parity must be adjusted to a given monetary expan-
sion. The present discussion about macroeconomic reform programs
can be seen as a discussion about the appropriate real devalu-
ation strategy. "Stabilization programs" stress the. need for
monetary contraction [see e.g. Sachs, 1987], whereas "adjustment
programs" rely on nominal devaluation in the first place [see
IMF, 1987]. Consequently, the relevant problem is not the , se-
quencing of price stabilization and real exchange rate adjust-
ment, but deciding on the appropriate real devaluation strategy.
This paper thus contributes to the debate about macroeconomic
This is the definition of the equilibrium real exchange rate
[Dornbusch, 1980, pp. lOOff.].- 2 -
reforms by analysing theoretically and empirically the efficiency
of the alternative strategies. Three questions are addressed:
- Can we discriminate between monetary contraction and nominal
devaluation with respect to their efficiency as real devalu-
ation strategies?
- Do the effects of the alternative strategies depend on structu-
ral characteristics of developing economies?
- Do structural policies such as trade, capital account, and
capital market liberalization affect the efficiency of real
devaluation strategies?
The basic hypothesis of this paper is that the efficiency of a
strategy depends on its effectiveness, its sustainability, and
its potential costs. The effectiveness is given by the speed and
extent to which real devaluation is achieved. Effectiveness is an
important issue because overvaluation is not without cost. The
distortion of price signals due to exchange rate misalignment
hampers the efficiency of production and leads to a misallocation
of investment, thereby reducing overall economic growth pros-
pects. The sustainability of a policy is determined by its feasi-
bility and credibility. The scope for monetary and exchange rate
policy may be seriously limited in the short run for developing
countries with high external indebtedness, high inflation rates
and fiscal problems. The extent to which macroeconomic con-
straints are strengthened or relaxed by a monetary contraction or
a nominal devaluation must be taken into consideration in order
to assess the feasibility and credibility of the alternative
strategies. The most relevant constraints are the fiscal deficit,
the foreign exchange position, and inflationary expectations. All
three restrictions can actually limit the scope for policy action
and, equally important, the whole reform program is likely to be
abandoned, if these variables cross certain thresholds. Finally,
the efficiency of a real devaluation strategy depends also on the
possible costs incurred in terms of changes in short-run economic
growth and investment activity. Again the credibility of the
reform program may be affected when the actual performance falls
short of a minimal target.- 3 -
The relative advantage of real devaluation strategies may be
affected once different economic structures of developing econo-
mies are considered. Structural characteristics matter, because
monetary contraction and nominal devaluation rely on different
adjustment mechanisms which, in turn, affect economic sectors to
a different extent. Consequently, the distribution of benefits
and costs is likely to vary between sectors depending on the
strategy applied and the net benefit for the whole economy is
influenced by the relative size of the sectors. Moreover, as
advocates of the structuralist approach to macroeconomics have
pointed out, even adjustment mechanisms are likely to depend on
economic structures [see Taylor, 1983, pp. 37-56]. In this con-
text the most important characteristics seem to be trade and pro-
duction structures. Country specific policy recommendations are
required if the relative advantage of real devaluation strategies
is influenced by structural characteristics.
Frequently, real exchange rate adjustment is part of reform
packages which contain, to different extents, liberalization
policies as well [see e.g. Sachs, 1989b]. Among these trade,
exchange control, and capital market liberalization policies
figure prominently. Provoked by the failure of most reform pro-
grams the debate on the sequencing of reform steps has been ex-
tended to the relation between macroeconomic and structural re-
forms. Policy recommendations range from "liberalize first" to
"stabilize first" [for an overview, see Edwards, 1989a, p. 8f.].
In this paper, it is argued that a real exchange rate devaluation
is of crucial importance in order to restore macroeconomic equi-
librium. The relevant question then is, whether liberalization
attempts do have an influence on the effectiveness, the sustain-
ability, and economic performance effects of a real devaluation.
If so, the relative advantage of the alternative strategies is
likely to be affected. This impact has to be taken into account
when discussing the optimal sequencing of macroeconomic and
structural reforms.- 4 -
The "structural characteristics" and the "sequencing" of the
paper are as follows. Section II outlines theoretical arguments
and formulates hypotheses on the efficiency of real devaluation
strategies, country specific qualifications, and appropriate
sequencing of reforms. The regression equations used to test the
hypotheses of Section II are given in Section III. Section IV
presents the estimation results and Section V summarizes and
gives policy conclusions.
II. Efficiency of Alternative Real Devaluation Strategies
1. Effectiveness, Constraints, and Economic Performance
The way in which the two strategies - monetary contraction and
nominal devaluation - affect the real exchange rate can be
analysed using the definition of real exchange rate changes given
in equation (1) [Saidi/Swoboda, 1983, p. 3]:
(1) R = N + (INF - INF*).
Assuming a constant foreign inflation rate (INF*), a devaluation
of the real exchange rate (R), i.e. R < 0, can be achieved by a
nominal devaluation (N defined as the relative price of foreign
currency to home currency) if domestic inflation does not in-
crease. This strategy of nominal devaluation is typically part of
IMF adjustment programs. On the other hand, it is possible to
devalue the currency in real terms when a monetary contraction
leads to a decline in domestic inflation and the nominal parity
of the currency is fixed. This is the strategy of a monetary
contraction implicitly included in macroeconomic stabilization
1 2 programs. '
It is important to distinguish between macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion and adjustment on the one hand and exchange rate stabili-
zation and adjustment on the other. The problem of stabilizing
the real exchange rate, i.e. the question of an optimal curren-
cy regime [see Schneeberger, 1989, p. 84ff.] is not analysed
here. It is assumed that the adjustment of the real exchange
rate is of first priority for developing countries, at least in
the short run.
2
The real exchange rate can be alternatively defined as the
ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods [Edwards, 1988a, p. 3].
contin. on page 5- 5 -
Possible disadvantages of the monetary contraction strategy are
(1) the lag between monetary supply changes and the adjustment of
goods prices and (2) the uncertainty arising from changes of the
demand for money which can even offset the disinflation effect of
a supply reduction. On the contrary, a nominal devaluation di-
rectly affects the real exchange rate. The initial real devalu-
ation may be even larger than the long-run real devaluation if an
inflationary impact is delayed. It is therefore to be expected,
that nominal devaluation has an advantage over monetary contrac-
tion as far as the effectiveness of real exchange rate devaluati-
on is concerned.
Arguably, the two strategies differ as well with respect to their
impact on macroeconomic constraints, namely the fiscal deficits,
foreign exchange reserves and inflation rates. The less a policy
raises fiscal deficits and inflation and the more it contributes
to the recovery of reserves, the more favourable it is, especial-
ly if these macroeconomic constraints are strictly binding. The
fiscal deficit which can be financed during an adjustment period
and the loss of foreign reserves a country can afford are limited
for economies rationed in external and/or domestic credit markets
in the first place. An additional inflationary impulse could
easily lead to hyperinflation in countries with extremely high
inflation rates. Binding constraints restricting the feasibility
of real devaluation strategies are therefore to be expected for
countries with high inflation rates and high external indebted-
ness. A reform strategy also needs to be credible in order to be
successful. Credibility, however, is eroded when macroeconomic
constraints are strengthened, making a reversal of the reform
program more likely. On the other hand, the real exchange rate
can be devalued to a larger extent or a given rate of devaluation
The two definitions are identical, if the relative weights, of
tradable and non-tradable goods in the price index of the home
and the foreign country are identical and if the law-of-one-
price holds for tradable goods. In the latter case, a nominal
devaluation directly affects tradable goods prices whereas a
monetary contraction only affects the prices of non-tradable
goods. The arguments with respect to equation (1) can then be
applied analogously.- 6 -
is easier to achieve, if such negative impacts are avoided by a
real devaluation strategy.
Fiscal deficit: It is favourable to apply the real devaluation
strategy which puts relatively less pressure on the government
either to raise additional domestic credits or to cut expendi-
ture. First, public credit demand crowds out private credit de-
mand and private investment. Second, political economy arguments
suggest that public investment expenditure will be cut in the
first place. This is because the reduction of subsidies and pay-
roll expenditures provokes the opposition of powerful interest
groups.
Monetary and exchange rate policies affect specific components of
the fiscal budget. A nominal devaluation increases the stock of
external public debt in terms of domestic currency. Government
revenue from import taxes will decline if a devaluation results
in lower import values (no J-curve effect). A monetary contrac-
tion presumably raises interest paid for domestic credits and
cuts revenues from inflation tax. Given the possibility of
cutting (other) expenditures or of raising (other) taxes, the
effect of the alternative real devaluation strategies on the
fiscal deficit basically depends on the relative importance of
the budget components just mentioned. Fiscal deficits can be
expected to rise particularly in countries with high external
indebtedness and high trade tax revenues when a nominal devalu-
ation is applied. High interest obligations for domestic credits
and high inflation tax revenues make rising fiscal deficits due
to a monetary contraction more likely.
The effects on the fiscal deficit determine the demand for addi-
tional financing. To the extent. that external credits are rati-
oned, the supply of financial funds is limited to the domestic
capital market. A monetary contraction possibly squeezes credit
How real exchange rate effects on fiscal deficit were influ-
enced by structural characteristics of the fiscal budget was
analysed by Reisen [1989, p. 9ff.]. But he did not distinguish
between alternative real devaluation strategies.- 7 -
supply. Consequently, a monetary contraction would require more
fiscal discipline than a nominal devaluation if domestic credit
supply is a binding constraint. The more a government depends on
domestic credit the less pronounced will then be a rise in fiscal
deficits in the case of a monetary contraction.
Foreign exchange: Especially when external credits are rationed
foreign exchange holdings determine the period in which a current
account deficit has to be removed or turned into a surplus. For-
eign exchange could be saved if the real devaluation is achieved
instantaneously and improves the current account immediately. A
disadvantage of the monetary contraction is that disinflation may
be delayed while the nominal parity is fixed thus resulting in a
real appreciation. Monetary contraction can, hence, hypothesized
to put additional strain on the foreign exchange position. On the
contrary, a nominal devaluation can be assumed to lead to an in-
stantaneous real devaluation. However, the current account may
deteriorate in the short run due to J-curve-effects.
Inflation: In many developing countries inflation is driven by
indexation rules which reflect inflationary expectations of pri-
vate agents. A real devaluation is not possible at all as long as
these expectations are determined by changes in tradable goods
prices exclusively. A similar result is likely in the case of a
nominal devaluation and markup pricing when a country depends
heavily on imported intermediate and capital goods [Taylor, 1983,
pp. 48ff.] . Such an inflationary impact could be avoided by a
monetary contraction. However, both monetary contraction and
nominal devaluation do not affect inflation rates in the short-
run if adaptive expectations dominate indexation rules. Under
such conditions a monetary contraction leads to a real appreci-
ation while a nominal devaluation reduces the real exchange rate.
In the long run, inflationary expectations will correspond to the
expectations about the consistency of monetary, exchange rate,
1 But the speed at which inflationary expectations can be reduced
crucially depends on the development of the fiscal deficit
[Sachs, 1987, p. 31? van Wijnbergen, 1987, p. 36].- 8 -
and fiscal policies. Assuming rational expectations, the infla-
tion rate and, consequently, the real exchange rate will immedi-
ately adjust to their long-run levels. The short-run real devalu-
ation achieved is then identical for both strategies.
The efficiency of a real devaluation strategy further depends on
its possible costs in terms of foregone real economic growth and
investment. The traditionally dominant view, i.e. that the sub-
stitution effects engendered by a real devaluation are suffici-
ently strong to assure an expansionary net effect on output, has
been increasingly challenged since the publication of the influ-
ential paper by Krugman and Taylor [1978]. However, the discus-
sion about contractionary versus expansionary effects of a real
devaluation is not very telling once the need for macroeconomic
reform is generally accepted. The relevant problem then is to
minimize contractionary effects and to maximize expansionary
effects of a real exchange rate depreciation by applying the
appropriate strategy. Three arguments point to differences be-
tween a monetary contraction and a nominal devaluation concerning
economic performance effects:
- Arguably, a nominal devaluation increases government expendi-
ture through its effect on external debt while a monetary con-
traction may reduce the revenues from the inflation tax. In the
first case the government balance-sheet increases whereas it
decreases in the latter case. This holds irrespective of whe-
ther the gap in the balance sheet is closed by higher deficit
financing or a cut in (other) expenditures. Therefore, dispos-
able private income is presumably higher after a monetary
contraction compared with a nominal devaluation. The distribu-
tion of national income would even shift in favour of the pri-
Cline [1983] provides a compendium of strange assumptions and
the evidence against them. Many models leading to "'queer ca-
ses' from the view point of traditional theory" are characte-
rized by "odd assumptions about 'substitutability' in produc-
tion or consumption" [Lai, 1989, p. 291]. For a detailed
discussion and empirical evidence, see Nunnenkamp/Schweickert
[1990b].- 9 -
vate sector if public expenditure is actually cut after a de-
cline of revenues from inflation tax. According to this
reasoning, more favourable economic performance effects can be
expected from a relatively higher private expenditure in the
case of a monetary contraction.
- As argued above, the monetary contraction strategy may result
in a lower credit supply. Negative investment effects are to be
expected, if domestic enterprises depend on domestic financial
sources in the first place [Rojas-Suarez, 1987, pp. 439f.].
This disadvantages may be offset, however, if a monetary con-
traction results in higher real interest rates through reducing
domestic inflation. These are favourable conditions for mobili-
zing domestic savings, lowering costs of financial intermedi-
ation, and stimulating private investment [Corsepius, 1989].
Therefore, it is an empirical question whether or not a mone-
tary contraction results in a credit contraction or a slowdown
in investment activity.
- Lower investment and economic growth effects can be expected
from a nominal devaluation, compared with a monetary contrac-
tion, due to rising prices for imported inputs. Particularly in
countries with strong import dependence. Higher prices for im-
ported inputs may significantly weaken incentives to shift
economic activities among sectors and to raise production
especially in sectors producing tradable goods.
Up to this point, the analysis of the relative merits and flaws
of the alternative real devaluation strategies shows that an
a-priori superiority can neither be established for a nominal
devaluation nor for a monetary contraction. The next question is
whether the picture is less ambiguous for specific country
groups, i.e. once structural characteristics are taken into
account.
Generally, a higher efficiency of private resource allocation
is assumed. Moreover, a positive overall investment response is
to be expected, if the private investment ratio is higher than
the public investment ratio.- 10 -
2. Impact of Trade and Production Structures
Contrary to structural policies, the basic characteristics of an
economy cannot be adjusted easily in order to optimize a real
devaluation strategy. The most important features of an economy
which are expected to impact on the relative advantage of the
alternative devaluation" strategies are the production and export
structure as well as the degree of openness. Most notably, agri-
cultural and more industrialized economies have to be distin-
guished.
According to advocates of the structuralist approach to macro-
economics, specific characteristics of developing countries where
production is dominated by manufacturing industries, are markup
pricing, dependence on imported intermediate and capital goods
and quantitative rather than price adjustment [Taylor, 1983, pp.
13-21]. High dependence on imports and, consequently, low price
elasticity of imports is disadvantageous especially when the
country chooses the nominal devaluation strategy. Higher losses
in foreign exchange as well as less investment and growth than in
a basically agricultural economy could be the result. The com-
parison is less clear-cut on the export side. In the case of a
nominal devaluation the expansion of capacity utilization and new
investment in manufacturing is hampered by higher input costs. On
the other hand, a monetary contraction possibly aggravates the
rationing of domestic credit needed to finance higher working
capital and investment.
In addition to the foreign exchange and the performance effects
the inflationary impact of alternative real devaluation strate-
gies may be influenced by the production structure as well. Wage-
indexation becomes more likely in more industrialized developing
countries with a higher degree of organization of the labour
force. An upward jump in prices causing the real wage to fall,
will then lead to wage increases which are passed along into
further price increases through markup pricing. This is the
classic case of a structural inflation. Such wage-indexation
rules make the overall rate of price increase highly sensitive to- 11 -
upward shocks [Taylor, 1988, p. 41f.]. The initial price shock
can be caused by a large nominal devaluation. With respect to
inflationary effects, a nominal devaluation may be better suited
for agricultural economies, whereas countries with a large manu-
facturing sector would be better advised to choose the monetary
contraction strategy.
The degree of openness is another relevant characteristic of an
economy. Openness towards world markets improves the likelihood
that changes in relative prices will be transmitted into supply
responses. Moreover, an open economy can achieve major trade v/
improvements with a relatively small real depreciation [Dorn-
busch, 1990, p. 9], Consequently the nominal devaluation or the
monetary contraction required can be weaker and adjustment costs
lower. Additionally, the nominal devaluation strategy could be
more effective in open economies, since large parts of the econo-
my are directly affected. On the other hand, its effectiveness is
reduced by the larger increase in the overall price level due to
a higher share of tradable goods in the price index.
3. Sequencing of Macroeconomic and Structural Reforms
IMF adjustment programs usually encompass structural policies
such as trade, exchange control, and capital market liberaliza-
tion. These policies can be expected to influence the determi-
nants and effects of real exchange rate changes, thereby giving
rise to questions of an optimal sequencing of macroeconomic and
structural reforms.
With respect to trade liberalization, i.e. lower import tariffs
and the abolition of non-tariff trade barriers, the short-run
growth impact of trade liberalizations is still debated, because
the opening-up towards the world market intensifies the need .for
domestic real adjustment [Edwards, 1989c]. It is argued that
liberalizing trade and devaluing the real exchange rate simul-
taneously may exceed the internal capabilities for adjustment
resulting in a negative feedback on the macroeconomic reform
process.- 12 -
But at the same time a trade liberalization dampens inflation
because of intensified competition and lower import prices. Both
effects can stimulate economic growth through a greater effici-
ency of domestic production [Ize, 1990]. Moreover, exports are
encouraged by lower prices for imported inputs. Exports may even
grow faster than imports thereby relaxing the foreign • exchange
constraint [ibid]. Furthermore the pressure on the fiscal budget
can decrease because of higher revenues from trade taxes when the
expansion of the tax base due to the substitution of quantitative
restrictions by tariffs and due to rising imports, offset the
decline in the tariff rate. These are clearly favourable condi-
tions for a macroeconomic reform and lead to the conclusion that
trade liberalization should not be postponed.
In case of a successful real devaluation policy, the reduced
expectations of future exchange rate depreciation can result in
capital inflows or the repatriation of flight capital. On the one
hand such capital inflows relax financial constraints. But they
may also lead to a real appreciation, due to a nominal appreci-
ation or rising domestic prices [McKinnon, 1984]. Moreover, spec-
ulation against the domestic currency will continue if the real
2
devaluation strategy is expected to fail. Given that extreme
This is consistent with the view that tariffs should be reduced
without a proceeding or accompanying real depreciation, the
exchange rate providing an anchor for domestic prices [Krueger,
1981]. On the other hand, serious doubts has been raised in the
literature about the possibility of a successful trade liberal-
ization without a preceding or simultaneous reduction of real
overvaluation [Corden, 1987; Michaely et al., 1989], fiscal
deficits [McKinnon/Mathiesen, 1981; McKinnon, 1984], and infla-
tion rates [Fischer, 1986 and 1987]. Moreover, historical evi-
dence from successful Asian exporters suggest that stabiliza-
tion should be consolidated before attempting trade reforms
[Sachs, 1987] .
2
The effects of speculation can be expected to differ according
to the exchange rate regime adopted. Arguably, floating, rates
do not constitute a one-way bet for speculators that pegged
rates do [Reisen, 1991, p. 53]. Consequently, floating rates
would be better suited for avoiding excessive capital flows.
But this argument applies to our analysis only to a limited
extent since the assumed real devaluation removes inconsisten-
cies in domestic policies which constitute the possibility of
one-way bets.Bib!iofh©k
des Instituts firr V/^v
- 13 -
capital movements in either direction could endanger the real
devaluation process, foreign exchange controls are advocated in
order to prevent a real appreciation [Dornbusch, 1983]. It is of
course possible to circumvent capital controls by overinvoicing
of imports and underinvoicing of exports [Agen6r, 1990]. But the
controls raise the costs and limit the extent of currency specu-
lation.The real devaluation policy may become more effective and
sustainable if private agents favour this as a safeguard against
destabilization in the case of a failure or massive capital in-
flows in the case of a successful reform. Moreover, a higher
2
stability of real exchange rate adjustment leads to more fa-
vourable investment conditions and growth prospects [Rodrik,
1989, p. 19; Faini/de Melo, 1990, pp. 29f.].
The success of real devaluation strategies can be additionally
influenced by capital market policies. Financial repression in
the form of low real interest rates typically has been the conse-
quence of institutionally fixed nominal interest rates combined
with high and accelerating inflation rates [Fry, 1988, p. 16].
The nominal devaluation strategy can thus be less favourable for
countries with repressed financial markets because its effective-
ness depends on the stability of inflation rates. On the other
hand, the disinflationary impact of a monetary contraction is
assumably less pronounced in countries which experienced low and
stable inflation rates in the past and where monetary authorities
build up some confidence in the stability of inflation.
Financial market developments are also important for the stabili-
ty of the adjustment process. A necessary condition for a reduc-
It is worth noting that overvaluation could generally not be
avoided or reduced by strict capital controls because it is due
to inconsistent domestic policies and distortions in capital
and goods markets in the first place [Fischer et al., 1985,.pp.
71f.]. However, the relevant question here is whether or not
free capital movements support a policy which tries to remove
inconsistencies between domestic policies, namely a real de-
valuation policy.
2
This holds only in the case of an adjustment towards the equi-
librium level. Otherwise short-run stability is only achieved
at the cost of a greater longer-run instability.- 14 -
tion of inflation is that the supply of goods and services grows
faster than demand. The supply response to a real devaluation
could be limited on the financial side by the availability and
the costs of credit. Capital supply to finance investment and
capacity utilization in sectors which experience additional de-
mand can fall short of demand if a monetary contraction leads to
a credit contraction. A demand surplus would be created or ex-
panded and inflation would accelerate [McKinnon, 1973, pp.
8"4ff.]. The possibility of such a disequilibrium adjustment pro-
cess emphasizes the need for a deregulation of capital markets. A
credit contraction resulting in disequilibrium in capital and
goods markets is most likely to follow a monetary contraction if
real interest rates are not allowed to rise in order to mobilize
private savings and to relax credit constraints [see Corsepius,
1989]. Additional incentives for efficient resource utilization
may be needed because a positive supply response could be hampe-
red by rising interest rates which increase the costs of working
capital market financing [Lizondo/Montiel, 1988, p. 37].
A deregulation of interest rates seems to be an important measure
to support a monetary contraction strategy. While reducing infla-
tion, a monetary contraction leads to higher real interest rates.
Consequently, a slowdown in monetary expansion and a deregulation
of interest rates are complementary. The problem of a competition
of instruments, recently at the centre of the discussion about
sequencing [see Sachs, 1989a, pp. 282ff. and Edwards, 1989a, p.
17] is avoided. A combination of capital market liberalization
and monetary contraction can therefore provide an appropriate
starting point of a real devaluation policy for financially re-
pressed economies.
The sequencing of structural reforms was analysed assuming that
real exchange rate devaluation is of crucial importance. The
sequencing of current .and capital account liberalization has
been discussed in the literature without explicitly considering
the need for macroeconomic stabilization. However, Sell [1990]
argues for an already liberalized current account accompanying
a capital account liberalization if the stabilization of domes-
tic prices has a high priority in economic policy. For other
contin. on page 15- 15 -
To conclude, the theoretical analysis of alternative real devalu-
ation strategies - nominal devaluation and monetary contraction -
does not prove an absolute advantage of a strategy after in-
cluding structural policies and structural characteristics of
developing countries. Neither an unique optimal reform package
nor an optimal program for each country group could be
established on theoretical considerations. Therefore, the next
step is the empirical analysis of the real devaluation strategies
based on the hypotheses presented above.
Ill. Equation Specification
The procedure in the empirical part will correspond to the pre-
sentation in the last section. In order to test the hypotheses
pooled cross-section regressions were performed using annual data
for 33 developing countries from 1979 to 1986. The time period
was chosen to include experiences with reform programs before and
after the debt crisis emerged. Biased results due to the structu-
ral break in 1982 are avoided by including dummy variables. The
33 countries provide a wide range of structural characteristics
and economic policies, especially with respect to real effective
exchange rate changes, inflation rates, and external indebted-
2
ness. All regressions were estimated using the ordinary-least-
squares technique.
arguments on the sequencing of structural reforms see
Edwards/van Wijnbergen [1986] and Edwards [1989d] for the cur-
rent-account-first position and Lai [1987] ; Bhandari [1989] and
Sell [1988] for the capital-account-first position. Blejer/Sa-
gari [1988] suggest liberalizing the domestic capital market
before relaxing exchange controls.
The countries are Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Greece,
India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Malawi, Malaysia,
Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South
Korea, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay,
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
2
The variance of the real effective exchange rate was high (low)
in 11 (10) sample countries: 10 (7) countries experienced high
(low) inflation rates. 13 countries were heavily indebted [for
the classification see Nunnenkamp/Schweickert, 1990b, pp.
35f.].- 16 -
1. Basic Equations
Equation (2) analyses the effectiveness of monetary and exchange
rate policies on the real exchange rate:
(2) R = aQ + a1M + a2N + a3TOT + a4NCF + a5Dl x NCF + a&Rl + a™ Dl,
where R = annual growth rate of the real effective exchange
rate (negative for devaluation);
M = annual growth rate of money supply Ml [IMF, d]
N = annual growth rate of the nominal effective ex-
change rate (negative for devaluation);
TOT = terms-ofrtrade shocks (positive for negative
shocks);
NCF = net inflow of long-term and short-term capital
relative to imports (in per cent) [IMF, a];
Rl = once lagged values of R;
Dl = Dummy variable (1 for 1979-1981; 0 otherwise).
Positive coefficients of a.. (a2) indicate, that a monetary con-
traction (nominal devaluation) results in a real exchange rate
depreciation. Contrary to M and N, the variables TOT and NCF re-
present determinants of the equilibrium real exchange rate. The
coefficient a. is expected to be positive, whereas the impact of
a terms-of-trade shock is theoretically indeterminate [Edwards,
1988b, pp. 319ff.]. Lagged values of the endogenous variable and
the dummy variable will be included as explanatory variables in
each of the following regression equations as well. The lagged
variables are used as a catch all for neglected variables in the
reduced-form equations. Dl and Dl x NCF test for a structural
break in the development of the endogenous variable and for a
change in the impact of net capital inflows after 1981 respec-
tively.
For the determinants of real exchange rates see Edwards [1988br
pp. 333ff.].
2
The calculation is based on nominal exchange rates and consumer
prices. Trade weights refer to the shares in world trade and
are calculated from IMF. Data is from IMF [b; d]. For the for-
mula applied and its economic justification see Fischer, Spin-
anger [1986, pp. 83ff.].
Measured as the hypothetical percentage changes of the current
account due to changes in import and export prices. For the
calculation, see Nunnenkamp, Schweickert [1990a, p. 480].- 17 -
Regression equations (3) - (5) analyse the effects of monetary
and exchange rate policies on foreign reserves, the fiscal defi-
cit, and inflation rates. The development of these variables was
hypothesized to be of crucial importance for determining the
feasibility and the credibility of a real devaluation policy.
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= foreign exchange reserves relative to imports (in
per cent) [World Bank, a];
= fiscal balance in per cent of GDP (negative values
for deficits) [IMF, d];
= annual growth rate of the consumer price index
[IMF, d];
= government expenditure relative to GDP (in per
cent) [IMF, d];
= annual growth rate of real GDP [UNCTAD, 1988];




INFC1 = once lagged values of RES, DEF, INFC.
Positive values of b., c., d. (i = 1,2) would imply, that a slow
down in monetary expansion or a nominal devaluation reduces all
three endogenous variables. Such an impact on inflation rates
would be positive for the devaluation process. Higher fiscal
deficits and a reduction in foreign exchange holdings, however,
could jeopardize the sustainability of a real devaluation strate-
gy. Equation (3) additionally includes TOT and NCF to correct for
external influences on the reserve position. Correspondingly, GE
and YR are included as control variables in the determination of
fiscal deficits. The exogenous variables INFC and INFC1 test for












Because of the high multicollinearity between monetary policy
(M) and the once and twice lagged values of the inflation rate,
adaptive expectations could not be tested directly. Using first
differences reduces multicollinearity substantially.- 18 -
Possible costs of a real devaluation in terms of weaker economic
growth and investment activity would lead to positive coeffici-
ents of the real exchange rate variable in equations (6) and (7).
(6) Y = en + enR + eoT0T + e.NCF + e.Dl x NCF + e_GE + e,.UMS
+ e°Yl +
1e8Dlf
2 3 4 5 6
(7) INV = fn + f R + f.TOT + f-NCF + f.Dl x NCF + f_Yl





where Y = annual growth rate of real GDP per capita [UNCTAD,
1988];
INV = gross investment relative to GDP (in per cent)
[World Bank, 1989];
UMS = unexpected money supply;
Yl,
INV1 = once lagged values of Y and INV.
Again, TOT and NCF account for the impact of external changes. GE
and UMS were included only in the growth equation because they
can be expected to have some impact on economic performance in
the short run, but do not affect investment considerations. Real
economic growth in the previous period was assumed to have a
favourable influence on investment decisions.
2. Variability of Coefficients
The estimation approach outlined in equations (2) - (7) would not
be sufficient to test the hypotheses raised in section II. The
arguments suggest, that the multipliers of monetary and exchange
rate policies as well as the impact of real exchange rate changes
are not constant. More specifically, the hypotheses suggest that
- economic performance effects of real exchange rate changes
depend on the policy instrument applied;
- the impact of monetary and exchange rate policies on fiscal
deficits varies with the structure of the fiscal budget;
- these coefficients can differ between country subgroups identi-
fied by different trade and production structures and varying
degrees of openness;
Unexpected money supply was proxied by the residuals of a re-
gression modelling money supply M2 as a autoregressive process
of third order [see Nunnenkamp/Schweickert, 1990a].- 19 -
- all coefficients of money supply, the nominal exchange rate,
and real exchange rate changes shown in equations (2) - (7) are
likely to be influenced by structural policies, i.e. by trade,
exchange control, and capital market policies.
Additional regressions were performed in order to test explicitly
the subsets of hypotheses by using a variable coefficient model
[Belsley, 1973]. The assumed relationship between the alternative
use of monetary or exchange rate policy and the multiplier of the
real exchange rate changes (R) on real growth and investment
should exemplify the procedure. Taking the coefficients of R from
























Positive coefficients of M and N show that a monetary contraction
or a nominal devaluation, i.e. M and N are declining, dampen
contractionary effects (e- , f.. > 0) and strengthen expansionary
effects (e1 , f.. < 0) of a real devaluation, because e. and f..
would decline as well. If then the coefficient of either M or N
is significantly larger, using this policy to devalue the real
exchange rate would be advantageous in terms of economic per-
formance .
The coefficients of equations (8) and (9) can be directly estima-
ted by substituting the expressions for e.. and f- in equations
(6) and (7). This provides an estimation approach with variable
coefficients.
A general problem of the approach is the heteroscedasticity of
the error term which arises because both the basic equations
and the equations for the coefficients are assumed to. be
stochastic equations. In order to avoid a misinterpretation of
significance levels, the variance-covariance matrix was cor-
rected for heteroscedasticity in all regressions using the
variable coefficients technique.- 20 -
(6
1) Y = eQ + e1QR + e^R x M + e^R x N + e2TOT + ... and
(7') INVR = fQ + f1QR + f11R x M + f12R x N + f2TOT + ...
The same procedure is applied to test the remaining hypotheses
about the variability of coefficients. The assumed relationships
between the coefficients and their determinants are given in the
following paragraphs.
Equations (10) - (11) account for the influence of the structural
composition of the fiscal budget on the fiscal balance effects of
monetary and exchange rate policies.














DF = new domestic credits raised by the government [IMF, c] ;
IT = inflation tax;
FIP = interest payments on external public debt [World Bank,
a];
TT = trade taxes [IMF, c].
Equation (12) tests for the influence of the structural charac-
teristics of an economy on the coefficients of monetary and ex-
change policy and for the impact of real exchange rate changes on
economic performance:
(12) y± = yi0 + y^EXPA + Yi2PSA + y^IIC + yi40P,
where ( 1,2 if y = a, b, c, d
i = (
(1 if y = e, f,
and EXPA = agricultural exports in per cent of total exports
[UN, a];
PSA = agricultural production in per cent of total GDP (both
measured in terms of factor costs) [World Bank, 1989];
All explanatory variables in equations (10)-(12) are expressed
in per cent of government expenditure (GE).
2
Defined as real money supply Ml multiplied by the rate of in-
flation (according to the consumer price index; INF); [see
Fischer/Trapp, 1986, p. 1118].- 21 -
IIC = imported intermediate and capital goods proxied by the
sum of imported industry supplies, fuels, machinery,
and transport equipment (in per cent of total imports)
[UN, a];
OP = degree of openness (sum of imports and exports in per
cent of GDP) [IMF, d].
Equation (13) formalizes the influence of structural policies on
the relevant coefficients.
(13)
where { 1,2 if x = a, b, c, d
(
(1 if x = e, f
and TP = trade policy proxied by average import tariff rates (in
per cent) based on tariffs which have actually been
collected [IMF, c];
foreign exchange controls proxied by the ratio of
black market to official exchange rates [Cowitt, a;
IMF, d];
capital market policy proxied by the ratio of Ml to
GDP (in per cent) [IMF, d];
capital market policy proxied by the ratio of M2 minus





1. Monetary Contraction Versus Nominal Devaluation
The empirical analysis strongly supports our basic hypothesis,
that the two alternative real devaluation strategies differ in
terms of their effectiveness, their impact on macroeconomic re-
This should be seen as a first approximation dictated by data
limitations. It assumes especially that quantitative restric-
tions are positively correlated with trade taxes.
For an economic justification
396] .
see e.g. Edwards/Khan [1985, p
Because of data limitations, financial deepening instead of
real interest rates is used as a proxy for capital market poli-
cy, i.e. financial repression. A positive correlation between
financial repression and financial deepening is assumed. Finan-
cial deepening is normally measured as the ratio of M2 to GDP
[Gupta, 1984, p. 8]. Here, M2 is split up into its components
Ml (KMP1) and savings and time deposits (KMP2). Opportunity
costs of the two components are different because of the nomi-
nal interest paid on the latter. Consequently different effects
on the coefficients are to be expected.- 22 -
strictions, and their economic growth and investment effects.
Effectiveness of the policy instruments is analysed in equation
(14) which provides the estimation results for the determinants
of real exchange rate changes (equation (2) above):
(14) R = -4.267*** + 0.306***M + 0.515***N
(-2.314) (10.211) (15.450)
+ 0.265TOT + 0.003NCF + 0.026DlxNCF
(1.477) (0.064) (0.331)
+ 0.097**Rl + 3.238D1 _2
(2.091) (1.143) R = 0.49.
The determinants of the equilibrium real exchange rate - TOT and
NCF - had no significant influence on real exchange rate changes
actually observed over the whole estimation period from 1979 to
1986. Real exchange rates were explained by the lagged endogenous
variable and the two policy variables in the first place. The
positive coefficients for both monetary and exchange rate policy
reveal that monetary contraction as well as nominal devaluation
led to a real devaluation. Although it is not recognized in the
literature, the significantly positive coefficient of M clearly
demonstrates that monetary contraction is indeed an alternative
to nominal devaluation for developing countries aiming at real
exchange rate devaluation. An F-test shows, however, that the
coefficient of N is significantly larger than the coefficient of
M (Table Al). This supports our expectation that a larger real
devaluation could be achieved by a nominal devaluation in the
short run. In other words, the expansion of money supply has to
be reduced to a larger extent in order to yield a desired short-
run effect on the real exchange rate, compared with the nominal
devaluation required for this purpose.
Pronounced differences between real devaluation strategies are
also to be observed with respect to their impact on the macro-
economic restrictions (Table 1). The reserve positions of de-
t-values in parentheses; ** significant at the 5 per cent
level; *** significant at the 1 per cent level (two-tailed
t-test).- 23 -
Table 1 - Monetary and exchange rate policy effects on reserve








































































t-values in parentheses; * significant at the 10 per cent level;
** significant at the 5 per cent level; *** significant at the 1
per cent level (two-tailed t-test). - For the specification of
regression equations and the definition of variables see equ-
ation (3) - (5) in the text.
Source: IMF [a; d]; UNCTAD [1988]; World Bank [a]; own calcula-
tions .- 24 -
veloping countries were generally not affected by changes in
monetary policy, but improved by devaluation of the nominal ex-
change rate. The positive effect of the nominal devaluation
strategy contradicts the existence of J-curve effects. A nominal
devaluation can rather be expected to relax the foreign exchange
constraint. At the same time, however, the sustainability of a
real devaluation process may suffer from the inflationary impact
of the policy adopted. In this respect a disadvantage of the
nominal devaluation strategy has to be recognized: Inflation was
accelerated by a nominal devaluation, whereas monetary contrac-
tion proved to be successful in significantly reducing price in-
creases of consumer goods. This is supported by the estimated
coefficients of INFC and INFC1. The coefficient of the once
lagged inflation variable calculated from these values (0.605) is
significantly smaller than 1. This result clearly contradicts the
hypothesis of adaptive expectations driving the inflation rate
which would require a coefficient significantly larger than 1.
Since an automatic acceleration of inflation is not to be ob-
served, there is a good chance to reduce inflation rates by a
properly implemented monetary contraction.
Contrary to the foreign exchange reserves and inflation rates,
fiscal deficits seem to be independent of both monetary and ex-
2
change rate policy. There are good reasons to assume that mone-
tary and exchange rate effects are determined by the structure of
the fiscal budget. Therefore, the fiscal balance equation has
The reserve position was strongly influenced by external condi-
tions. A worsening of the terms-of-trade led to a decline in
foreign exchange holdings. The coefficients of NCF, Dl x NCF,
and Dl reflect the change in the lending regime in 1982. Obvi-
ously, developing countries held significantly higher reserve
positions after 1981 in order to guarantee liquidity for exter-
nal payments in a situation where external credits were no lon-
ger easily available (negative coefficient of Dl). Moreover,
countries with declining reserves apparently had priority
access to remaining credit lines mainly from official sources
(negative coefficient of NCF and positive coefficient of Dl x
NCF) .
As was to be expected, a decline in real economic growth and
rising government expenditures led to rising fiscal deficits.- 25 -
been reestimated allowing the coefficients of monetary and ex-
change rate variables to be determined by the structural composi-
tion of the fiscal budget:
(15) DEF = 1.254 + 0.027**M - 0.001***MxDF
(2.061) (2.301) (-4.834)
+ O.OOOMxIT - 0.155N + O.OOONxFIP
(0.438) (-1.617) (0.073)
+ 0.001**NxTT + 0.033YR - 0.151***GE
(2.026) (0.918) (-5.438)
+ O.549***DEF1 - 0.532D1 _2
(9.890) (-1.565) R = 0.75
A first important result is that monetary contraction per se can
actually cause fiscal deficits to rise. This is shown by the
significantly positive coefficient of M, i.e. for the constant
component of the money multiplier. However, the negative coef-
ficient of MxDF reveals that the deterioration of the fiscal
balance induced by a monetary contraction is less severe if a
high share of government expenditure is financed by domestic
credits. Interest rates are possibly fixed in most countries so
that there are no higher credit costs connected with a monetary
contraction. Moreover, available credit funds are likely to de-
cline. If the government's share of total credit available is
limited the fiscal deficit is bound to decline. Under such con-
ditions fiscal discipline is enforced by a monetary contraction
especially if the share of expenditure financed by domestic
credit is high.
The impact of inflationary financing remains insignificant. Re-
duced receipts from the inflation tax do not limit the feasi-
bility of a monetary contraction. Arguably, the inflation tax is
not important in low inflation countries and receipts do not
t-values in parentheses? * significant at the 10 per cent
level; ** significant at the 5 per cent level; *** significant
at the 1 per cent level. - For the specification of the repres-
sion equation and the definition of variables see equations
(4), (10), and (11) in the text.- 26 -
necessarily decline in high inflation countries because the rela-
tionship between money creation and inflation tax revenue has
become indeterminate or even negative.
The nominal devaluation effect on the fiscal budget is not
changed by actual foreign interest payments. Because of sover-
eignty problems in international lending a rise in interest pay-
ment obligations (in terms of the borrower currency) does not
necessarily lead to higher actual interest payments. The fiscal
effects then depend on the transfer negotiations. Contrary to the
impact of foreign interest payments the rise in fiscal deficits
due to a nominal devaluation increases with higher revenues from
trade taxes. The effect of higher prices for tradables seems to
be more than offset by the lower quantities traded. This is in
line with the result that no J-curve effect is to be observed if
currencies are devalued in nominal terms (see Table 1). As a
consequence a nominal devaluation can diminish government revenue
from trade taxes thereby increasing the fiscal deficit. Since the
share of trade taxes in total government revenue is normally high
in developing countries the feasibility of a nominal devaluation
could be seriously affected.
Generally speaking, regressions run on the macroeconomic restric-
tions determining the sustainability of a real devaluation did
not reveal a clear advantage of any particular devaluation stra-
tegy. Table Al shows that significant differences between the
policy instruments exist with respect to their impact on the
reserve position and inflation rates. The F-tests performed,
however, point to conflicting conclusions: a nominal devaluation
is superior in relaxing foreign exchange constraints but raises
inflation. On the other hand, inflation can be reduced by a mone-
tary contraction. The appropriate policy choice thus depends on
the specific situation of a country, i.e. whether it suffers more
from a shortage of foreign exchange or from accelerating infla-
tion rates. With respect to fiscal deficits the estimation with
variable coefficients has shown that the feasibility of monetary
contraction depends on fiscal discipline whereas fiscal budget- 27 -
effects of nominal devaluations are determined by the importance
of revenues from trade taxes in the first place. Again, the opti-
mal policy choice depends on the specific political and economic
situation of a country.
The regressions testing for possible costs of real exchange rate
changes are presented in Table 2. Most notably, the hypothesis of
contractionary effects of real exchange rate changes can not be
confirmed for a fairly wide spectrum of developing countries [see
also Nunnenkamp/Schweickert, 1990a]. This hypothesis would imply
significantly positive coefficients of R. Moreover, the estimated
coefficients reveal that the use of monetary and exchange rate
policies actually influences the performance effects of real
exchange rate changes to different extents.
The economic performance effects of alternative real devaluation
strategies are clearly demonstrated in the regressions run on
economic growth. The coefficients of the variables RxM and RxN
are highly significant in the second version of the growth equ-
ation. Their positive values imply that both monetary contraction
and nominal devaluation could reduce contractionary effects and
enhance expansionary effects of a real exchange rate devalu-
ation. But the coefficient of R remains insignificant in the
first growth equation. This coefficient can be interpreted as the
average growth impact of changes in R. Its insignificance re-
flects the fact that both the growth of money supply and nominal
Growth and investment effects of changes of the terms-of-trade,
net capital inflows, government expenditure and money supply
shocks remain insignificant. This points to the heterogeneity
of the country sample with respect to the impact of the vari-
ables. The reduction in domestic absorption after the beginning
of the debt crisis led generally to a cut in investment in the
first place (positive coefficient of Dl in the investment equ-
ations) . On the contrary, real economic growth is found to be
different for the two subperiods only when the influence of the
monetary and exchange rate variables is not. explicitly taken
into consideration. The differences in economic growth seem to
be at least partly due to a change in monetary and exchange
rate policies.
2
Section III.2 above exemplifies the interpretation of the co-
efficients .- 28 -















































































































t-values in parentheses; * significant at the 10 per cent level; **
significant at the 5 per cent level; *** significant at the 1 per
cent level (two-tailed t-test). - For the specification of regres-
sion equations and the definition of variables see equations (6), (7)
and (6'), (7') respectively in the text. -
variables were multiplied by 100.
DThe coefficients of these
Source: IMF [a; b; d]; UNCTAD [1988]; World Bank [a, 1989]; own calcu-
lations.- 29 -
exchange rate changes show large variances in the data sample.
Systematic effects on the real exchange rate multiplier are thus
obscured. Furthermore monetary expansion experienced an upward
trend in the period 1978-1986, whereas nominal exchange rates
were devalued on average. Any systematic effects on the multi-
plier would have neutralized each other. High variability and
opposing trends of N and M, explain why their significant impact
on the multiplier did not result in a significant average multi-
plier of the real exchange rate on economic growth.
Contrary to the growth equation RxM and RxN remain insignificant
in the investment equation. The significant coefficient of R in
the second version of the investment equation indicates that real
devaluation per se has an positive effect on investment activity.
Presumably, the indeterminate impact of monetary and exchange
rate policies and the variability of these policy variables ren-
dered the average multiplier insignificant in the first invest-
ment equation.
What matters in the first place, however, is the relative advan-
tage of the alternative strategies which is determined by the
differences between the coefficients of RxM and RxN. In both
equations, the coefficient is significantly larger for RxM (Table
Al). Consequently, the monetary contraction strategy seems to be
better suited to enhance positive and to reduce negative economic
growth and investment effects of a real devaluation. This result
strongly supports the hypotheses of favourable economic perfor-
mance effects of the monetary contraction strategy, namely that
it avoids a sharp increase of import prices, that it can lead to
a reallocation of disposable income in favour of the private
sector, and that it does not squeeze investment activity.
2. Economic Structure and Real Devaluation
Contrary to structural policies, a country can not change its
economic structure in the short run in order to optimize a reform
package. In this perspective, structural characteristics provide
the given background for each reform program. By and large the- 30 -
regression results presented in Table 3 support the hypotheses
raised in the theoretical part of the paper.
As was to be expected, the inflationary impact of the nominal
devaluation strategy is greater in more industrialized countries
with a low share of agricultural products in total exports
2
(EXPA). Additionally, the effectiveness of this strategy is
smaller when the share of imported intermediate and capital goods
in total imports (IIC) is high.
But the same results are to be observed in the case of a monetary
contraction strategy so that the relative advantages of the al-
ternative strategies are not affected significantly. Economies
with high shares of agricultural exports can expect a more fa-
vourable development of inflation rates and the effectiveness of
both strategies is higher if import dependency is relatively low,
irrespective of the real devaluation strategy adopted. Moreover,
expansionary production and investment responses to a real de-
valuation are more likely in agricultural economies as was hypo-
thesized. This is shown by the significantly negative coeffici-
ents of RxEXPA and RxPSA in the growth and investment equations.
Contrary to trade and production structures, the openness of an
economy impact on the relative advantage of the real devaluation
strategies. Openness is not an impediment to the nominal devalu-
ation strategy. Obviously, the stronger competitive pressure
compensates for the higher sensibility of the overall price level
to nominal devaluations. But the disinflationary effect of mone-
tary contraction is significantly reduced in the case of high
The reserve equation is not presented here because it turns out
again that the reserve position is determined by the control
variables exclusively.
2
The results are less clear-cut if production and export shares
of manufacturing industries are used to characterize the struc-
ture of an economy (see also Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix).
Additionally, deficit reduction in the case of a monetary is
more likely in agricultural economies and economies with high
import dependency.- 31 -
Table 3 - Economic structure and real devaluation in developing countries, 1979-1986
Dependent Explanatory variables
variables Const. H MxEXP MxPSA MxIIC MxOP N NxEXPA NxPSA HxIIC NxOP
DEF 1.513" 0.207 0.000 -0.001* -0.002' -0.000 0.235 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000
(2.028! ,1.623! i0.249) i-1.942) i-1.7441 10.461 • il.355! i-0-6581 1-0.094) 1-1.518) i-0-316!
INF 6.430"' 1.618"' 0.011"' -0.008 -0.011' -0.010'" 0.190 0.011« -0.008 -0.009 0.002
(3.4171 (2.875! 12.782> s-0.894) 1-1.859) i-3.208s 10.195) 11.7971 (-0.489) (-0.884) 10.578!
R -0.758 1.303"' 0.004 0.002 -0.013" -0.005" 1.919" 0.005 0.006 -0.203' -0.000
(-0.434) (2.605' (1.570! (0.359) (-2.086) i-2.289) (2.25H 11.427) (0.776) (-1.955) i-0.190)
Dependent Explanatory variables
variables Const. R RxEXPA RxPSA HxIIC RxOP
Y -0.042 0.313 -0.001 -0.002" -0.003 -0.001
(-0.0551 10.915) 1-0.760) (-2.139) (-0.717) i-0.869)
INV 1.567" 0.268 -0.001' -0.001' -0.003 -0.001
(2.169) (1.6191 1-1.684) (-1.700) .-1.469) 1-1.1801




the 1 per cent level itwo-tailed t-test). - For-the, specification of regression equations and the definition-of variables
see equations .2), |4H7), and i12) in the text. - The complete regression results are presented in Table A2 and A3 in the
Source: IMF (a; b: d]: UN [aj: UNCTAD [19881; World Bank [a, 1989]: own calculations.
openness, reflecting the strong impact of world market conditions
on the price level. Consequently, the effectiveness of the mone-
tary contraction strategy is impaired in open economies.
3. Structural Policies and Real Devaluation
The next step is to test for the influence of trade, exchange
control, and capital market policies on the effectiveness, sus-
tainability and costs of a real exchange rate devaluation (Table
4). The results are important for the design of consistent re-
form packages. They are clear-cut for trade and exchange control
The reserve and fiscal deficit equations are not reported in
Table 4 because they show no significant impact of structural
policies.- 32 -



















I NxTP NxFEC RxKKPl NxKNP2
.003 -0.313 0.009 0.033 0.010 -0.009
.433' 1-0.9741 (0.800! ,0.349! !0.9071 t-1.211»
0.357 -0.044* 0.193 0.042" 0.011




variables Const. R RxTP RxFEC RxKMPl RxRMP2
Y 0.250 -0.039 0.004* -0.006*" -0.003 0.003'**
10.301) (-1.005) 11.940) 1-2.840) (-1.094) 12.614.!
INVR 1.960*" 0.007 0.002« -0.003** -0.003" 0.001
(2.715! (0.571) (1.778! (-2.088) (-2.137) 10.717)
1
t-values in parentheses; « significant at the 10 per cent level: " significant at the 5 per cent level: **« significant at
the 1 per cent level (two-tailed t-testl. - For the specification of regression equations and the definition of variables
see equations (2) -(7) and (13) in the text. - The complete regressions are presented in Table A4 in the Appendix.
Source: IMF [a; b: c; d]; Cowitt [a]: UNCTAD [1988]; World Bank [a, 1989]; own calculations.
policies. A restrictive trade policy seems to be unfavourable for
a real devaluation whereas a restrictive exchange control policy
seems to support the devaluation process. The picture is less
clear for capital market policies.
The external competition provided by a liberal trade regime en-
forces the adjustment of relative prices to external shocks or
policy changes and enhances allocative efficiency. Consequently,
a low level of import tariffs (TP) makes both real devaluation
strategies more effective and leads to better economic per-
formance effects of a real devaluation. This is clearly demon-
strated by the significant coefficients for MxTP, NxTP, and RxTP
respectively. The result supports the view that trade liberaliza-
tion should not be postponed until a macroeconomic reform has
been launched.- 33 -
On the contrary, a liberal exchange control policy can have nega-
tive effects on the real devaluation process. With stable inter-
est rates at home and abroad, a real devaluation provides an in-
centive for capital inflows because it reduces overvaluation and
therefore the probability of future devaluations. A rise in the
price level or an nominal appreciation of the currency is the
likely consequence of such a shift of short-term financial funds
into the country. Table 4 reveals that especially the effective-
ness of the monetary contraction strategy can be increased by the
use of exchange controls. The higher significance level of MxFEC
compared with NxFEC in the real exchange rate equation reflects
the fact that in developing countries with more or less fixed
nominal exchange rates the inflationary impact of capital move-
ments figures more prominently. More restrictive capital controls
significantly strengthen the inflation reducing effect of a mone-
tary contraction. This effect, however, has been shown before to
be a necessary condition for the effectiveness of a monetary con-
traction with respect to a real exchange rate depreciation.
The higher stability of the real exchange rate adjustment pro-
vided by exchange controls leads to better economic performance
effects of a real devaluation. This is reflected in the negative
coefficients for RxFEC which show that short-run contractionary
effects of a real devaluation are reduced and expansionary
effects enforced by exchange controls. The benefits of reducing
exchange controls can be expected to rise when inconsistencies in
economic policy have been removed. Consequently, their liberali-
zation should possibly be postponed until expectations of real
exchange rate devaluations are reduced substantially by a macro-
economic reform.
The conclusions are less clear-cut with respect to capital market
policies. The estimated coefficients reveal that a low level of
money supply Ml relative to GDP (KMP1), i.e. strong financial
repression, weakens the effectiveness of the nominal devaluation
strategy and enhances the disinflation effect of a monetary con-
traction. These results point to an advantage of the monetary- 34 -
contraction strategy in financially repressed economies which is
further supported by the complementarity of monetary contraction
and financial liberalization. The levels of savings and time
deposits relative to GDP (KMP2) is shown to affect only the
growth impact of real exchange rate changes. It can thus be
assumed that relatively high interest rates, which are at least
necessary for high levels of KMP2, negatively affect short-run
economic growth effects of a real devaluation by raising adjust-
ment costs. Nevertheless, the balance is in favour of capital
market liberalization due to the positive effects of low finan-
cial repression on investment activity. Especially financial
liberalization via reducing inflation seems to be suitable for
supporting a real devaluation.
V. Summary and Policy Conclusions
The theoretical arguments and the empirical results presented in
this paper have shown that there are two basic strategies for
real exchange rate devaluation - monetary contraction and nominal
devaluation. Therefore, the present discussion about macroecono-
mic reform programs is actually a discussion about real devalu-
ation strategies. "Stabilization programs" are typically based on
monetary contraction, whereas "adjustment programs" rely on nomi-
nal devaluation in the first place. Consequently, the relevant
problem is not the sequencing of price stabilization and real
exchange rate adjustment, but the decision on the appropriate
real devaluation strategy which should be based on meaningful
efficiency criteria.
It is the basic hypothesis of this paper that the efficiency of
real devaluation strategies depend on
- their effectiveness, i.e. the speed and extent of the real
exchange rate devaluation achieved,
- their sustainability, i.e. their effects on the foreign ex-
change reserves, the fiscal deficit, and inflation rates, and- 35 -
- their potential costs, i.e. the economic performance effects of
a real exchange rate devaluation measured in terms of economic
growth and investment activity.
The relative efficiency of the alternative strategies is likely
to be affected by the sequencing of real devaluation and structu-
ral reforms encompassing trade, exchange control, and capital
market liberalizations. Additionally, the impact of trade and
production structures on the efficiency of real devaluation is to
be considered. The theoretical analysis of these issues reveals
that an a-priori superiority can neither be established for a
nominal devaluation nor for a monetary contraction.
The empirical results on the effectiveness and sustainability of
the real devaluation strategies can be summarized as follows:
- Both monetary contraction and nominal devaluation lead to a
real devaluation in the short run, but effectiveness is higher
in the case of a nominal devaluation.
- The nominal devaluation strategy should be preferred if foreign
reserves represent a binding constraint. Changes in monetary
policy are neutral with respect to the reserve position, where-
as a nominal devaluation increases foreign exchange reserves.
The opposite conclusion is arrived at if high inflation is the
major problem: A monetary contraction dampens inflation, wher-
eas a nominal devaluation has an inflationary impact.
- In the case of a monetary contraction, favourable effects on
inflation rates and the real exchange rate can above all be
expected in countries with repressed financial markets, re-
strictive exchange controls, and a relatively small external
sector. Additionally, fiscal discipline is enforced by a mone-
tary contraction if the share of expenditure financed by domes-
tic credit is high.
- In the case of a nominal devaluation effectiveness will be high
in countries with low and stable inflation rates. But revenues
from trade taxes will rather decline than rise after a nominal
devaluation. Consequently, rising fiscal deficits due to a- 36 -
nominal devaluation can be expected for countries depending on
trade taxes to finance government expenditure in the first
place.
- Both monetary contraction and nominal devaluation are shown to
be more effective and to result in lower inflation rates if
import tariffs are low, the share of agricultural products in
total exports is high, and dependence on intermediate and
capital goods imports is low.
The hypothesis of contractionary effects of real exchange rate
devaluations on economic growth and investment is not confirmed
for the fairly wide spectrum of developing countries covered by
our analysis. More specifically the results for the economic
performance effects of real exchange rate devaluation show that
- a monetary contraction is better suited to enhance expansionary
effects and to reduce contractionary effects;
- a liberal trade regime enforces expansionary effects;
- at least under present conditions of inconsistent economic
policies, the opposite result turned out for exchange restric-
tions ;
- low and stable inflation rates lead to a higher investment
activity by reducing financial repression;
- high interest rates can dampen positive supply responses;
- agricultural economies can generally expect better economic
performance effects from a real devaluation policy, compared
with more industrialized economies.
All in all, it can be concluded that an unique optimal strategy
for real exchange rate devaluation does not exist. The relative
advantage of the alternative strategies heavily depends on the
severity of macroeconomic constraints limiting the feasibility of
policy options, basic characteristics of the economies concerned,
and the economic policy framework with respect to structural
reforms. In order to derive definite policy conclusions, the most
binding constraints have to be identified in each particular- 37 -
case. In other words, detailed country studies are required in
order to devise appropriate policy options. Country studies are
particularly required to explain why the effectiveness, the
feasibility and economic performance effects of real devaluations
are generally better for agricultural compared with more indus-
trialized economies, irrespective of the real devaluation
strategy adopted.
Further research is also required as far as the sequencing of
macroeconomic and structural reforms is concerned. It is safe to
assume that macroeconomic reform, i.e. real devaluation, is of
high priority in the typical developing country context. However,
our results strongly conflict with the widespread belief that
microeconomic liberalization should be postponed until after
macroeconomic disequilibria have been removed. Particularly,
trade liberalization should not be postponed. It rather helps the
real devaluation process irrespective of the devaluation strategy
adopted. By contrast, the evidence of this paper suggests that
the real devaluation process is rendered more difficult by an
immediate relaxation of capital controls. However, it has to be
evaluated in ongoing research whether the maintenance of exchange
restrictions for the adjustment period is a first best solution,
or whether this result is due to exchange rate regimes adopted
and inefficiencies in domestic markets. In any case, successful
real devaluation may help a first step towards capital market
liberalization, namely a reduction in inflation rates. In this
context, monetary contraction is clearly superior to the nominal
devaluation strategy.
Again in contrast to common belief, our analysis shows that mone-
tary contraction has important merits in achieving real devalu-
ation. This raises the question whether the principal flaw of
this strategy, i.e. being subject to serious financial con-
straints, may be overcome by additional policy measures. The
sustainability of monetary contraction heavily depends on the
availability of foreign exchange and on fiscal discipline. The
scope for a monetary contraction thus depends on the possibility- 38 -
to relax external and domestic financial bottlenecks by means of
external assistance, by promoting private savings or through a
reduction of fiscal deficits. The decision about external assis-
tance is mainly under control of the IMF and the World Bank un-
less private foreign creditors relax the strict credit rationing.
International financial institutions may consider to grant more
assistance to countries striving for real devaluation through
monetary contraction in order to assure the feasibility of this
strategy. Assistance may be conditioned on internal efforts to
raise domestic savings and to cut fiscal deficits. Moreover fi-
nancial constraints may be eased by transforming non-tariff trade
barriers into tariffs thereby raising revenues from trade taxes.
Such a conversion is generally acknowledged as a first important
step towards trade liberalization so that the effectiveness and
economic performance effects of real devaluation will be improved
along with the feasibility and credibility of the reform program.- 39 -
Appendix Tables
Table Al - Efficiency of Alternative Real Devaluation Strategies in De-,

















Number of restrictions and degrees of freedom (F-statistic) and number
of restrictions respectively (CHI
2-statistic) in parentheses. - * sig-
nificant at the 10 per cent level; ** significant at the 5 per cent
level; *** significant at the 1 per cent level. - Regressions with and
without.restrictions are compared. The restrictions are given by the
hypothesis. The hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic is signifi-
cant. The relevant test statistic is the CHI
2-statistic in the case of
regression with variable coefficients and the F-statistic otherwise.
The coefficients of these variables are equated. - The tests were run
for the equations with these dependent variables.
Source: See Table 1; own calculations.- 40 -
Table A2 - Sustainability and Effectiveness of Real Devaluation Strategies and






















































































































































































































































































































t-values in parentheses; * significant at the 10 per cent level; ** significant at the
5 per cent level; *** significant at the 1 per cent level (two-tailed t-test). -
 aFor
the specification of regression equations and the definition of variables see equati-
ons (2)-(5) and (15) in the text; EXPM = share of manufactured goods in total exports
(in per cent); PSM = share of manufactured goods in GDP of factor costs (in per cent).
Source: See Table 3; own calculations.- 42 -
Table A3 - Economic Performance Effects of Real Exchange Rate Changes








































































































































t-values in parentheses; * significant at the 10 per cent level; **
significant at the 5 per cent level; *** significant at the 1 per cent
level (two-tailed t-test). -
 aFor the specification of regression equ-
ations and the definition of variables see equations (6), (7), and (15)
in the text; EXPM = share of manufactured goods in total exports (in per
cent); PSM = share of manufactured goods in GDP of factor costs (in per
cent) .
Source: See Table 3; own calculations.- 43 -
Table A4 - Structural Policies and the Efficiency of Real Devaluation Strate-














































































































































































































































t-values in parentheses; * significant at the 10 per cent level; ** significant
at the 5 per cent level; *** significant at the 1 per cent level (two-tailed
t-test). - For the specification of regression equations and the definition of
variables see equations (2)- (7), and (14) in the text.
Source: See Table 4; own calculations.- 45 -
References
Agenor, Pierre-Richard [1990], Stabilization Policies in Develop-
ing Countries with a Parallel Market for Foreign Exchange: A
Formal Framework. IMF Working Paper 90/16, Washington D.C.
Belsley, David A. [1973], "On the Determination of Systematic
Parameter Variation in the Linear Regression Model", in:
Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Vol. 2, pp. 487-
494.
Bhandari, Jagdeep S. [1989], "Trade Reform Under Partial Currency
Convertibility", in: IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp.
494-513.
Blejer, Mario I., Silvia B. Sagari [1988], "Sequencing the Liber-
alization of Financial Markets", in: Finance & Development,
Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 18-20.
Cline, William R. [1983], "Economic Stabilization in Developing
Countries: Theory and Stylized Facts", in: John Williamson
(ed.), IMF Conditionality, Institute for International Econo-
mics, Washington, pp. 175-208.
Corden, W. Max [1987], "Protection and Liberalization: A Review
of Analytical Issues", in: IMF Occassional Papers, 54,
Washington.
Corsepius, Uwe [1989], "Liberalisation of Capital Markets in De-
veloping Countries", in: Intereconomics, Vol 24, No. 5, pp.
220-226.
Cowitt, Philipp P. (ed.) [a], World Currency Yearbook, New York,
var. iss.
Dornbusch, Rudiger [1980], Open Economy Macroeconomics, Mew York.
Dornbusch, Rudiger [1983], "Flexible Exchange Rates and Inter-
dependence", in IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 3-30.
Dornbusch, Rudiger [1990], Credibility and Stabilization, Centre
for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 454,
London.
Edwards, Sebastian [1988a], Exchange Rate Misalignment in De-
veloping Countries, World Bank, Occasional Paper No. 2, N.S.,
Washington.
Edwards, Sebastian [1988b], "Real and Monetary Determinants of
Real Exchange Rate Behavior. Theory and Evidence from De-
veloping Countries". Journal of Development Economics, Vol.
29, S. 311-341.
Edwards, Sebastian [1989a], On the Sequencing of Structural Re-
forms, NBER Working Paper No. 3138, Cambridge, Mass.- 46 -
Edwards, Sebastian [1989b], Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation, and
Adjustment. Cambridge, Mass.
Edwards, Sebastian [1989c], "Structural Adjustment Policies in
Highly Indebted Countries", in: Jeffrey D. Sachs (Hrsg.),
Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 1:
The International Financial System. Chicago und London, S.
159-208.
Edwards, Sebastian [1989d], "Tariffs, Capital Controls, and Equi-
libirum Real Exchange Rates", in: Canadian Journal of Econo-
mics, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 79-92.
Edwards, Sebastian, Moshin S. Khan [1985], "Interest Rate Deter-
mination in Developing Countries", in: IMF Staff Papers, Vol.
32, No. 3, pp. 377-403.
Edwards, Sebastian, Sweder van Wijnbergen [1986], "The Welfare
Effects of Trade and Capital Market Liberalization", in:
International Economic Review, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 141-148.
Faini, Riccardo, Jaime de Melo [1990], Adjustment, Investment and
the Real Exchange Rate in Developing Countries, paper presen-
ted at the Economic Policy Panel Meeting, April 1990, Paris,
mimeo.
Fischer Bernhard, Ulrich Hiemenz, Peter Trapp [1985], Argentina:
The Economic Crisis in the 1980s, Kieler Studien, 197, Tubin-
gen.
Fischer, Bernhard, Dean Spinanger [1986], Factor Market Distor-
tions and Export Performance: An Electic Review of the Evi-
dence. Kiel Institute of World Economics, Working Paper, 259.
Fischer, Bernhard, Peter Trapp [1986], "Public Sector Deficits
and the Dynamics of the Inflation Tax in Argentina", in:
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali,
Vol. 33, S. 1107-1127.
Fischer, Stanley [1986], "Issues in Medium Term Macroeconomic
Adjustment", in: World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 1, No. 2,
pp. 163-182.
Fischer, Stanley [1987], "Economic Growth and Economic Policy",
in: Vittorio Corbo et al., Growth-oriented Adjustment Pro-
grams, Washington, pp. 151-178.
Fry, Maxwell A. [1988], Money, Interest, and Banking in Economic
Development, Baltimore and London.
Gupta, Kanhaya Lai [1984], Finance and Economic Growth in De-
veloping Countries, London and Sydney.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) [1987], Theoretical Aspects of
the Design of Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs. Occassional
Papers, 55, Washington D.C.- 47 -
International Monetary Fund (IMF) [a], Balance of Payments Sta-
tistics. Washington, var. iss.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) [b], Direction of Trade Statis-
tics. Washisngton, var. iss.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) [c], Government Finance Statis-
tics Yearbook, var. iss.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) [d], International Financial
statistics, var. iss.
Ize, Alain [1990], Trade Liberalization, Stabilization, and
Growth: Some Notes on the Mexican Experience. IMF Working
Paper 90/15, Washington D.C.
Krueger, Anne 0. [1981], "Interactions Between Inflation and
Trade-Regime Objectives in Stabilization Programs", in: Wil-
liam R. Cline and Sidney Weintraub (eds.), Economic Stabili-
zation in Developing Countries, Washington, pp. 83-114.
Krugman, Paul, Lance Taylor [1978], "Contractionary Effects of
Devaluation", in: Journal of International Economics, Vol. 8,
pp. 445-456.
Lai, Deepak [1987], "The Political Economy of Economic Liberali-
zation", in: The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 1, pp.
273-299.
Lai, Deepak [1989], "A Simple Framework for Analysing Various
Real Aspects of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Poli-
cy", in: Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 25, pp. 291-
313.
Lizondo, J. Saul, Peter J. Montiel [1988], Contractionary Devalu-
ation in Developing Countries: An Analytical Overview. IMF
Working Paper 88/51, Washington D.C.
Mathieson, Donald J., Ronald I. McKinnon [1981], How to Manage a
Repressed Economy, Princeton Essays in International Finance,
145, Princeton.
McKinnon, Ronald I. [1973], Money and Capital in Economic De-
velopment. The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.
McKinnon, Ronald I. [1984], "The International Capital Market and
Economic Liberalization in LDCs", in: the Developing Econo-
mies, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 476-481.
Michaely, Michael, Demetris Papageorgiou, Armeane Choksi [1989],
Trade Liberalization: The Experience of Developing Countries,
paper prepared for the Conference "Attempts at Liberaliza-
tion: Hungarian Economic Policy and International Experience"
in Budapest, 16-18. November, mimeo.- 48 -
Nunnenkamp, Peter, Rainer Schweickert [1990a], "Adjustment Poli-
cies and Economic Growth in Developing Countries - Is Devalu-
ation Contractionary?", in: Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol.
126, pp. 474-493.
Nunnenkamp, Peter, Rainer Schweickert [1990b], Real Exchange
Rates and Economic Growth in Developing Countries - Is De-
valuation Contractionary? Kiel Institute of World Economics,
Working Paper, 405, Kiel.
Reisen, Helmut [1989], Public Debt, External Competitiveness, and
Fiscal Discipline in Developing Countries. Princeton Studies
in International Finance, 66, Princeton.
Reisen, Helmut [1991], On liberalising the Capital Account: Ex-
periences with Different Exchange Rate Regimes, preliminary
paper prepared for the Jahrestagung des Vereins fur Social-
politik, October 1991, Lugano, mimeo.
Rodrik, Dani [1989], Policy Uncertainty and Private Investment in
Developing Countries, NBER Working Paper, 2999, Cambridge
Mass.
Rojas-Suarez, Liliana [1987], "Devaluation and Monetary Policy in
Developing Countries. A General Equilibrium Model for Econo-
mies Facing Financial Constraints", in: IMF, Staff Papers,
Vol. 34, Washington, pp. 439-470.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. [1987], "Trade and Exchange Rate Policies in
Growth-Oriented Adjustment Programs", in: Vittorio Corbo et
al. (eds.), Growth-Oriented Adjustment Programs. Washington
D.C., S. 291-325.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. [1989a], "Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the
Debt Crisis", in: Jeffrey Sachs (ed.), Developing Country
Debt and the World Economy, Chicago, pp. 275-284.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. [1989b] (ed.), Developing Country Debt and the
World Economy, Chicago.
Saidi, Nasser, Alexander Swoboda [1983], "Nominal and Real Ex-
change Rates: Issues and Some Evidence", in: Emil-Maria
Claasen, Pascal Sabin (eds.), Recent Issues in the Theory of
Flexible Exchanger Rates, Amsterdam, pp. 3-27.
Schneeberger, Barbara [1989], Wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen
alternativer Wechselkursregelungen in Entwicklungslandern.
Die Erfahrungen Lateinamerikas. Grvisch.
Sell, Friedrich L. [1988], "True Exposure - The Analytics of
Trade Liberalization in a General Equilibrium Framework", in:
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 124, S. 635-652.
Sell, Friedrich L. [1990], The Analysis of Capital Account Liber-
alization in a General Equilibrium Framework, University of
Giessen, Discussion Paper in Development Economics, 9,
Giessen.- 49 -
Taylor, Lance [1983], Structuralist Macroeconomics. Applicable
Models for the Third World, New York.
Taylor, Lance [1988] , Varieties of Stabilization Experience.
Towards Sensible Macroeconomics in the Third World, New York.
United Nations (UN), Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,
Vol. 1, New York, var. iss.
UNCTAD [1988], Handbook of International Trade and Development
Statistics. Supplement 1987, New York.
van Wijnbergen, Sweder [1987], Fiscal Deficits, Exchange Rate
Crises and Inflation. NBER Working Papers, 2130, Cambridge,
Mass.
World Bank [a], World Development Report, Washington, var. iss.
World Bank [1989], World Tables 1988-89, Washington, var. iss.